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ON PROTECTING CHILDREN-FROM CENSORSHIP: A
REPLY TO AMITAI ETZIONI
MARJORIE HEINS*
INTRODUCTION
Concerns about sex and violence in the media, and their possible
ill effects on young people, continue to drive our cultural politics. The
topic has intrigued me for at least a decade-ever since, as an ACLU
lawyer in the 1990s, I began to wonder about the underlying basis for
the widespread assumption that minors are harmed by sexual or vio-
lent content in art and entertainment.
This curiosity eventually led me to leave the ACLU and begin
writing Not in Front of the Children: "Indecency," Censorship, and the
Innocence of Youth.' My comments here in response to Amitai Etzi-
oni's 2 thoughtful, well-intentioned, but ultimately superficial argu-
ment for Internet filters and other restrictions aimed at youth are
partly drawn from my research for Not in Front of the Children. I
have also continued to think and write about the youth censorship
issue as part of my work at the Free Expression Policy Project
("FEPP").3
Before I begin, a word about terminology. Some readers object
to the term "censorship" when applied to restrictions that are aimed
at youth, or that simply burden disfavored speech rather than sup-
pressing it completely. They are right that "censorship" has acquired
* Director, Free Expression Policy Project, www.fepproject.org. I am grateful to the
Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies for inviting me to participate in this Symposium.
1. MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: "INDECENCY," CENSORSHIP,
AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH (2001) [hereinafter NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN].
2. Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Thirty-Three Media Scholars, Interactive Digital Soft-
ware Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-3010) (expressing scholars'
concern that courts should not rely on commonly held but mistaken beliefs about a proven
causative link between violent entertainment and violent behavior to uphold a censorship law),
available at www.fepproject.org/courtbriefs/stlouis.html; Marjorie Heins, A Psychologist Surveys
the Wreckage, www.fepproject.orgfbookreviews/mediaviolenceJF.html (June 19, 2002) (review-
ing JONATHAN FREEDMAN, MEDIA VIOLENCE AND ITS EFFECT ON AGGRESSION: ASSESSING
THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2002)).
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a pejorative connotation in U.S. politics today, but I use the term in a
descriptive, rather than an accusatory, sense. Censorship means sup-
pressing or restricting speech based on disapproval of its content,
even if only one group is targeted or if the silencing is less than com-
plete.4 Parents censor their children all the time, and society generally
approves of their right to do so. Teachers properly control class dis-
cussions, and thereby censor extraneous subjects as well as uncivil
forms of address.
The subject of this symposium, however, is government-imposed
censorship--in the form of mandatory Internet filters, rating systems,
and "harmful-to-minors" laws-and whether such restrictions are
wise or justified. Hence, I use the terms "censorship," "suppression,"
and "restriction" more or less synonymously, and without necessarily
adverse connotations.
Etzioni's argument for government censorship-that is, restric-
tions on the art and information available to minors-rests on a series
of false premises and a reductive use of language which assumes the
thing to be proven. I will start, then, by unpacking the premises and
the language of Etzioni's argument. After that, I will review some
salient facts that Etzioni seeks to minimize regarding both the opera-
tion of Internet filters and the social-science research on media ef-
fects. Next, I will discuss the First Amendment rights of youth and the
competing interests of (many) parents and political leaders in shield-
ing minors from expression that they believe to be offensive, vulgar,
age-inappropriate, or an impetus for bad attitudes and behavior. Fi-
nally, I will suggest some non-censorial approaches to society's wide-
spread and legitimate concerns about the effects of media content on
young people.'
These non-censorial approaches are critical to my argument. Of-
ten, those who oppose Internet filters and other presumed solutions
to the problem of minors and controversial expression are accused of
being oblivious to the very real and understandable concerns of par-
ents and others involved with the upbringing of youth. To the con-
trary, I would suggest that affirmative, speech-enhancing
4. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000) ("It is of no
moment that the statute does not impose a complete prohibition. The distinction between laws
burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree.").
5. I use the terms "minors," "youth," or "young people" to refer to both children and
adolescents. As Etzioni points out, those who are skeptical of censorship tend to use these
terms; on the other hand, those who favor censorship tend to refer to "children," though they
generally advocate restrictions on the material available to adolescents as well.
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approaches-media literacy; sexuality education; public funding of
alternative media-are far more likely to be effective in combating
the nefarious influences of vulgar, irresponsible, or just plain stupid
mass-media entertainment than are speech-restrictive approaches
such as ratings, V-chips, Internet filters, and "harmful-to-minors"
laws.
I. REDUCTIVE LANGUAGE AND FALSE PREMISES
A. "Protection" and "Harm"
In Etzioni's very first paragraph (indeed, in his title), his choice
of language assumes that no question exists that sex and violence in
the mass media are harmful, so that minors must be protected from
them. This assumption immediately puts those skeptical of censorship
on the defensive by casting them as ideologues who are at best un-
concerned about children, and at worst child abusers.
Choice of language, of course, is a rhetorical device. In fact, the
assumption that minors overall are psychologically harmed by expo-
sure to sexual or violent content is unproven and probably unprov-
able. In section III, I outline the distortions and misrepresentations
that have been perpetrated over the years by some proponents of the
"causal hypothesis" (the view that sex or violence in the media cause
bad attitudes and behavior). At bottom, words like protection and
harm mask moral or normative judgments about what is appropriate
for youth.
But why quibble about social science or the validity of the causal
hypothesis, I'm often asked, when it's obvious that much mass-media
entertainment is vulgar, reflects irresponsible attitudes about sex and
violence, offends majoritarian standards of good conduct, and is in-
appropriate for young children? There are two answers.
First, there is value in intellectual honesty. We should not base
public policy on false propositions about social-science research. And
if in fact the real issue is not proven psychological harm, but offense
to sexual or social morality, combined with fear (albeit unverifiable)
that youngsters will imitate what they see onscreen, then censorship
becomes both less politically justifiable and less likely to resolve our
anxieties. If the real concern is with the upbringing of youth-
inculcation of good sexual values and socialization into acceptable
behavior (including alternatives to violence) - then education, not
2004]
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censorship, is the only remedy for what's troublesome in mass media
entertainment.
The second answer also relates to intellectual honesty. How are
we to identify and define what we think (even if we can't prove) is
harmful? All censorship schemes, whether direct ones like obscenity
laws and Internet filters or indirect ones like V-chips and ratings,
founder on this intractable problem of defining what it is we want to
restrict. Etzioni avoids this massive definitional problem, asserting
that "which kinds and forms" of violent content should be restricted
"is an issue we face only once we move away" from First Amendment
absolutism. 6 But the problem is inherent in any attempt to restrict
such broad and vague categories of expression as sex and violence. As
countless pundits have observed, both are as plentiful in Shakespeare,
Homer, and the Bible as in Bruce Willis movies or Bugs Bunny car-
toons.
If you are proposing a censorship system, you cannot avoid the
challenge of defining what it is you want to suppress or restrict. And
because the effects of human expression are varied, and depend upon
a host of variables including ambiguity, irony, humor, style, and con-
text, the definitional challenge is formidable. It is a challenge that has
not been and probably cannot be met, either by scholars who favor
censorship of the information available to youth, or by social science
researchers who seek to prove harm from such broad categories of
expression as "violent" media content.
B. "Civil Libertarians"
Another misuse of language involves a dichotomy that Etzioni
sets up early in his article between "civil libertarians" and "many so-
cial conservatives" - with the author, of course, representing the rea-
sonable middle ground. But neither "civil libertarians" nor "social
conservatives" are a uniform or undifferentiated group. Indeed, many
civil libertarians are also social conservatives. And when it comes to
censoring fantasy violence-as opposed to sex-it is usually social
liberals, not conservatives, who are leading the charge. In short, the
political landscape is more complicated than Etzioni suggests.
Here are a few examples. Civil libertarians are badly split on the
issue of campaign finance. In 1998, all but one of the ACLU's former,
still-living presidents, executive directors, legal directors, and legisla-
6. Etzioni, supra note 2, at 40.
[Vol 79:229
ON PROTECTING CHILDREN- FROM CENSORSHIP
tive directors publicly took issue with the organization's continuing
opposition to campaign finance reform despite ever-more compelling
evidence of the need for controls on wealthy contributors' corruption
of the democratic process.7
Similarly, civil libertarians differ on the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting cross-burning with the intent to intimidate.8 Not all civil
libertarians are "First Amendment absolutists," and many believe
that where tangible harm is shown (cross-burning and uncontrolled
campaign contributions being two examples), restrictions on expres-
sion are justified.
The problem with the media violence debate is that real harm
hasn't been shown, and can't be. As I discuss in section III, the ways
in which art and entertainment influence human attitudes and behav-
ior are far too complex and multi-faceted to lend themselves to sim-
ple cause-and-effect analysis. You don't necessarily have to be a civil
libertarian to see that there ought to be demonstrable harm from an
identifiable and definable category of speech before it is restricted or
suppressed.
II. INTERNET FILTERS
A. How Filters Work
Etzioni describes five cases involving censorship of the informa-
tion, art, and ideas available to youth. Three of the five concern
Internet filtering. It is clear that Etzioni believes filtering is an impor-
tant and needed response to widely shared concerns about minors'
access to vulgar, violent, or other controversial online content. But his
account obscures Internet filters' two fundamental flaws: their broad
and subjective categories of disfavored content, and their irrational,
keyword-based operation. The consequence of these flaws is that fil-
tering, whether deliberately or inadvertently, blocks an immense
amount of valuable expression. These are not failures that can be
7. See Brennan Center for Justice, Former ACLU Leaders Break From ACLU Position
on Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Reform,
www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_1998/pressrelease_1998_0619.html (June 19,
1998).
8. The Supreme Court faced this issue recently in Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
See Marjorie Heins & Stephanie Hershkovitz, Free Expression Policy Project, The FEPP Su-
preme Court Page: Free Expression Cases in the 2002-2003 Supreme Court Term,
http://www.fepproject.org/fepp/supremecourt.html#black (last updated Oct. 29, 2003).
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corrected, and Etzioni's hope that technological improvements will
make filters defensible is therefore misguided.
Regardless of what the marketing departments of the companies
that produce them claim, Internet filters by necessity depend. on key-
words or phrases to identify potentially inappropriate Internet sites.
Examples are: "over 18," "sex," "pussy," and other words or word
combinations that are likely to appear on sites containing pornogra-
phy but are also found on artistic, literary, and informational sites of
all kinds. And because there are more than an estimated two billion
Web pages, many of them changing daily, 9 there is no way that filter-
ing companies can review even a fraction of the sites that are flagged
through keyword searches as possibly troublesome in order to elimi-
nate false positives.
The results have been well-documented. As FEPP found when it
surveyed more than seventy tests and studies, filters routinely blocked
countless legitimate Web sites. These included the home pages of the
Traditional Values Coalition and Massachusetts Congressman Ed-
ward Markey; part of the City of Hiroshima site; Georgia O'Keeffe
and Vincent Van Gogh sites; numerous gay and lesbian sites; the
Declaration of Independence; Shakespeare's complete plays; Mari-
juana: Facts for Teens (a brochure published by the National Institute
on Drug Abuse); the University of Kansas's Archie R. Dykes Medical
Library (upon detecting the word "dykes"); the "Let's Have an Af-
fair" catering company; searches for Bastard Out of Carolina and
"The Owl and the Pussy Cat;" and, after detecting the phrase "least
21," a news item on the Amnesty International site. (The offending
sentence read, "Reports of shootings in Irian Jaya bring to at least 21
the number of people in Indonesia and East Timor killed or
wounded.")1"
9. See Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,419 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
10. Marjorie Heins & Christina Cho, Free Expression Policy Project, Internet Filters: A
Public Policy Report, www.fepproject.org/policyreports/filteringreport.html (2001) (summariz-
ing more than seventy tests and studies); see also ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION
CENTER, FILTERS AND FREEDOM 2.0: FREE SPEECH PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNET CONTENT
CONTROL (David Sobel ed., 2001); NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 181-200;
Victoria Rideout et. al., Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, See No Evil: How Internet Filters
Affect the Search for Online Health Information (Executive Summary),
http://www.kff.org/content/2002/3294/Internet Filtering-exec summ.pdf at 6-7 (Dec. 2002)
(stating that even at the least restrictive settings, filters block 1.4 percent of health information
sites and 9 percent of sexual health sites; at more restrictive settings, they block up to 24 percent
of health sites). Thus, claims by filtering companies that filters are "more than 99% accurate,"
Etzioni, supra note 2, at 20, even if correct, (which they are not-even the government's expert
in American Library Association v. United States found error rates of 6-15 percent, 201 F. Supp.
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The three-judge court that struck down the Children's Internet
Protection Act ("CIPA")1 1 in 2002 made similar findings. 12 It ex-
plained in detail how filters work: first, by "harvesting" potentially
troublesome sites; then by "winnowing," a process that involves hu-
man review of some sites but nevertheless blocks tens of thousands of
valuable, non-controversial ones. Although the decision was over-
turned by the Supreme Court in June 2003, the justices took no issue
with the three-judge court's extensive fact-findings. 3
The three-judge court found that 10,000 to 30,000 Web pages en-
ter the "work queue" at filtering companies each day, to be reviewed,
theoretically, by staffs of between eight and "a few dozen" people.
"Given the speed at which human reviewers must work to keep up
with even a fraction of the approximately 1.5 million pages added to
the publicly indexable Web each day," the court said, "human error is
inevitable. ' 14 Thousands of pages are blocked that are not reviewed
by company employees. For many sites or groups of sites, filters block
all pages, no matter how innocent, based on a "root URL." Likewise,
one item of disapproved content-for example, Salon.com's sexuality
column-results in blockage of the entire site. The court gave numer-
ous examples of blocking that was obviously caused by mindless key-
word algorithms-from a Knights of Columbus site, misidentified by
CyberPatrol as "adult/sexually explicit" to a site on fly fishing, mis-
identified by Bess as "pornography."' 5
In addition to these mechanical mishaps, and to the extent that
human review plays a role in the process, filtering depends on quick,
subjective judgments by company employees. These judgments are
driven by the political and moral views of the company owners.
Hence, within already broad and vague blocking categories such as
2d at 419), would still mean, given over two billion Web pages, that more than 20 million of
them are erroneously blocked.
11. CIPA requires all schools and libraries receiving federal aid or E-rate discounts for
Internet connections to install filters on all computers. Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(b) (2000)). Given that
the law restricts adults' Internet access, calling it the "Children's Internet Protection Act" re-
flects a familiar political strategy of imposing widespread censorship using the rhetorical appeal
of child protection.
12. Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401.
13. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2306 (2003).
14. Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
15. Id. at 431-48. The court noted dozens of other religious, health, sports, and career-
related sites that were mistakenly blocked, including a guide to allergies (blocked by Bess filter
as "Adults Only, Pornography"); a health question and answer site sponsored by Columbia
University (blocked by Bess as "Sex"); and a job-search site for social workers (blocked by
Cyber Patrol as "Adult/Sexually Explicit"). Id. at 446-47.
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"sex acts," "drugs," "hate/discrimination," or "alternative lifestyles,"
companies make decisions that discriminate against non-sexually ex-
plicit sites relating to gays and lesbians; non-mainstream religions
such as Wicca or paganism; and sites dealing with free expression and
censorship-especially if they are critical of Internet filtering.16
That these crude, often mindless filters are seriously considered
as an acceptable means of classifying art and information is a sad
commentary on our body politic. Even putting aside the tens of thou-
sands-perhaps millions-of wrongly blocked pages, the underlying
premise of filtering is an absurdly reductive view of human expres-
sion. Under this view, identifying suspect words divorced from their
context, and consigning different types of expression to a cyber-
purgatory of Web inaccessibility based on those words, is perfectly
fine, because nuance, ambiguity, and context no longer matter. In-
stead, access to information and culture depends on mechanistic de-
vices manufactured by private companies that are eager for sales and
oblivious to the intellectual process-of minors or anybody else.
B. The Dangers of CIPA
Before we leave the world of filters, it's also necessary to take is-
sue with Etzioni's characterization of CIPA. The law, he says, is
"rather modest"; it "merely" adds one little requirement-installing
filters-to the existing conditions for E-rate discounts or federal fund-
ing for Internet connections. If schools and libraries don't like the
condition, they can refuse the federal aid.,'
The problem here is that conditioning government aid on sup-
pressing speech, especially when the condition is imposed on libraries
and schools, raises serious concerns about equity and, indeed, about
the democratic process. Like universities and museums, libraries and
schools are society's centers of imagination, culture, and intellectual
growth. Libraries in particular are the great equalizers; historically,
they have provided "free access to books, ideas, resources, and in-
formation for education, employment, enjoyment and self-
16. See Internet Filters: A Public Policy Report, supra note 10, at App. A (listing blocked
sites by subject); Brief of Amici Curiae Partnership for Progress on the Digital Divide et al. at
17, United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003) (No. 02-361) (referring to in-
stances of viewpoint discrimination including blocking of sites critical of filtering companies or
of Internet censorship generally), available at www.fepproject.org/courtbriefs/cipabrief.pdf.
17. Etzioni, supra note 2, at 16.
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government." 18 In today's digital age, public libraries provide infor-
mation and knowledge for all citizens, especially those on the wrong
side of the digital divide, who do not have Internet access at school,
home, or work. To force libraries, as CIPA does, "to choose between
remaining true to their mission as public information gateways" or
else "acting as the agents of private corporate information gatekeep-
ers," 19 is bad public policy, and fundamentally inconsistent with First
Amendment values.
Conditions on government funding are thus particularly suspect
when imposed on institutions like libraries that are dedicated to the
acquisition of knowledge. As the Supreme Court has said, "even in
the provision of subsidies, the Government may not 'aim at the sup-
pression of dangerous ideas."' 20 The condition imposed by CIPA is
especially insidious-indeed, it is irrational-because the actual deci-
sions about what to suppress are delegated to for-profit companies
that have conservative ideologies, that make countless errors because
of the nature of keyword-based blocking, and that do not even dis-
close what they block.
Thus, the view of the Supreme Court plurality in the CIPA
case-that Internet filtering is no different from the professional
judgments librarians make when they choose not to purchase certain
books for their collections 21--is off-base, both factually and legally.
Factually, as one of the plaintiffs' briefs pointed out, it is the policy of
most libraries to make available as much information as possible,
without professional screening; librarians do not view themselves as
moral guardians, restricting access to material that is "unworthy." It is
only cost and space that prevent libraries from acquiring all of the
books and periodicals in the world-problems that are conspicuously
absent with the Internet.
22
Secondly, and most important factually, delegating Internet
blocking to third parties has nothing in common with the professional
selection decisions of librarians; instead, it deprives them of profes-
sional discretion by forcing them to install software that blocks tens of
18. Brief of Appellees Multnomah County Public Library et al. at 24, United States v. Am.
Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003) (No. 02-361), available at
http://supreme.1p.findlaw.com/supreme-courtbriefs/02-361/02-361.mer.resp.mpl.pdf.
19. Brief of Amici Curiae Partnership for Progress on the Digital Divide et al., supra note
16, at 25-26.
20. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).
21. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
22. Brief of Appellees Multnomah County Public Library et al., supra note 18, at 3-4, 26.
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thousands of useful Web sites on every conceivable subject and also
discriminates against viewpoints disfavored by filter manufacturers.
Moreover, CIPA does not mandate a selection system, for it is in the
nature of the Internet that once it is offered, all of it has been se-
lected. As Justice Souter, dissenting from the Supreme Court's CIPA
decision, found, requiring filters is the functional equivalent of "buy-
ing an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with anything thought
to be unsuitable for adults. '
'23
As a matter of law, CIPA should have been found unconstitu-
tional under any standard of First Amendment scrutiny. Because the
Internet has the quintessential characteristics of a public forum, espe-
cially when made available in libraries, strict scrutiny should have
applied, as the three-judge court found in striking down the law.24 But
even if-as the Supreme Court plurality concluded -Internet access
in libraries does not create a public forum,25 the operation of filters is
so mindless and bizarre that requiring them on all computers should
not have passed even rational-basis scrutiny.
None of this means that (as supporters of the law might phrase
it) the government is required to fund pornography in public libraries.
Some conditions on funding are constitutional, and if filters only
blocked the categories of expression explicitly targeted by CIPA-
"obscenity," "child pornography," and "harmful to minors" mate-
rial-the legal and public policy problems with the law would be
much reduced. But there is a massive gap between the content tar-
geted by CIPA and the operation of filters, even at their least restric-
tive settings. Neither keyword algorithms nor filtering company
employees are able to make legal judgments about whether a Web
site meets the obscenity or "harmful to minors" standard.26 Filters
thus censor huge amounts of valuable material that is not even close
23. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2321-22 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
joined in Souter's dissent; Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent that focused on the imper-
missibility of requiring censorship as a condition of government funding for a wide range of
private expression. Id. at 2312-18.
24. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 454-70 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see
also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868, 870 (1997) (the Internet is a "vast democratic forum,"
with content "as diverse as human thought").
25. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 2304-05 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). Justice
Kennedy, concurring, did not address the public forum issue, and Justice Breyer, concurring,
would have applied heightened-but not "strict"-scrutiny because libraries serve such an
important function in the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 2309-10,2311.
26. The current three-part obscenity test is set out in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973). The "harmful to minors" test originated with the standard approved in Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-41 (1968), which then evolved to become a variant of Miller.
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to the three banned categories. It is central to the nature and function
of libraries to make such material available, especially to the elderly,
lower-income citizens, residents of rural areas, and others on the
wrong side of the digital divide.
27
Etzioni's argument for filtering, in the end, relies on emotion
rather than legal or policy analysis. He asks why "civil libertarians"
don't at least admit that "hard-core pornography in the hands of
young children is harmful, wrong, and ought to be stopped. '28 Hard-
core pornography is certainly not edifying for young children; it is
also incomprehensible to most of them. Whether it is psychologically
harmful, should they come upon it, remains in doubt. And even if we
believe it "ought to be stopped," Internet filters are not an acceptable
way to go about it.
III. THE SOCIAL-SCIENCE RESEARCH
A. The Bogus Claims of Proven Harm
Although Etzioni acknowledges at one point that it is overly
simplistic to claim that the media are "'the' cause of violence and
sexually inappropriate conduct," he repeatedly asserts that "signifi-
cant harm is caused" and that "the social science data strongly sup-
port the need to protect children from harmful material, especially
from exposure to violence in the media and on the Internet. ' 29 To
support these statements, he relies heavily on the work of two leading
researchers, Leonard Eron and Rowell Huesmann, without noting
that their claims have been seriously challenged. Nowhere does he
acknowledge the critiques of his favored researchers' methodology or
the studies showing that, even accepting the methodology, most ex-
periments seeking to demonstrate adverse effects of media violence
have yielded negative results.
Fantasy violence is an eternal theme in art, literature, and enter-
tainment. In the past century, with the advent of social science, some
researchers have attempted to prove adverse effects. In the 1950s,
psychiatrist Fredric Wertham asserted that his informal research with
27. See Brief of Amici Curiae Partnership for Progress on the Digital Divide et al., supra
note 16, at 21-25, for a description of the various demographic groups disadvantaged by the
digital divide.
28. Etzioni, supra note 2, at 19.
29. Id. at 35, 36, 39.
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juvenile delinquents proved that violent comic books caused crime.
Wertham's methods were anecdotal; he had no control groups; and he
mistakenly relied on correlations as proof of causation. But his asser-
tions resonated with a public eager for answers to concerns about
crime.30
By the 1960s, television became a target as well. Soon after its
emergence, politicians began to stoke public anxieties about violent
content. At the same time, a new "social learning" school of psychol-
ogy posited that children imitate media violence. These psychologists
believed that such effects could be measured through laboratory ex-
periments, but these were by definition artificial constructs, did not
replicate the real-world context in which art and entertainment are
experienced, and used proxies or substitutes for the real-world ag-
gressiveness they sought to measure.
Albert Bandura, leader of the social learning school, conducted
such experiments using large rubber toys called Bobo dolls. He dem-
onstrated that some children shown films of adults hitting Bobo dolls
will imitate the behavior immediately afterward. Even though Bobo
dolls are meant to be hit, and aggressive play is far different from
real-world harm, Bandura announced that he had proved adverse
effects from media violence.31
The announcement resonated politically, and the federal gov-
ernment was soon funding other studies. The first major result of this
funding was a 1972 Surgeon General's report that noted a "prelimi-
nary and tentative indication" of a causal link between TV violence
and real-world behavior, but cautioned that this possible effect was
"small," and only in children already predisposed to aggression. 32 As
historian Willard Rowland recounts, however, legislators misrepre-
sented the report's cautious conclusions, claiming that a definitive
link had been proven.33 Psychologist Stuart Fischoff notes that it was
30. See Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression
Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 741 (1992); Frederic M. Thrasher, The Comics and Delinquency: Cause or Scape-
goat, 23 J. EDUC. SOCIOLOGY 195 (1949); John E. Twomey, The Citizens' Committee and
Comic-Book Control: A Study of Extragovernmental Restraint, 20 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS.
621,624 (1955).
31. Albert Bandura et al., Imitation of Film-Mediated Aggressive Models, 66 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 (1963). Bandura popularized his claims in Look magazine. Albert Bandura,
What TV Violence Can Do to Your Child, LOOK, Oct. 22, 1963, at 46.
32. Surgeon General's Advisory Comm. on Television & Social Behavior, Television and
Growing Up: The Impact of Televised Violence 4, 7, 67 (1972), available at
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/C/G/I_/nnbcgx.pdf.
33. WILLARD D. ROWLAND, JR., THE POLITrcs OF TV VIOLENCE 135-96 (1983).
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almost impossible in these years to get government funding for media
research unless one was looking for harmful effects.
34
University of Toronto psychologist Jonathan Freedman, who be-
gan studying media-effects research in the early 1980s, was astounded
at the disparity between the claims being made and the actual results.
In a 1984 article, he reported that although there is a small statistical
correlation between preference for TV violence and aggressive be-
havior, there is no evidence of a causal link. Laboratory experiments,
which can show short-term imitation, are too artificial to offer any
insight into TV's real-world impact. And field experiments, more
realistic attempts to gauge media-violence influence, had wholly in-
conclusive results.
35
Freedman found several instances of researchers manipulating
results to bolster their theories. A field experiment in 1973, for exam-
ple, widely cited in support of the causal hypothesis, had numerous
measures of aggression, all of which failed to produce any finding of
adverse effects. Not satisfied, the researchers divided the children
into "initially high aggression" and "initially low aggression" catego-
ries, and again compared results. Still, there were no indications of
harm from viewing violent programs (such as "Batman" and "Super-
man"). The initially high-aggression group, for example, became
somewhat less aggressive after the experiment, no matter which pro-
grams they watched. But after more number-crunching, the research-
ers found that the initially high-aggression children who were shown
violent programs "decreased less in aggressiveness" than the initially
high-aggression children who watched neutral programs. They seized
upon this one idiosyncratic finding to claim support for the causal
hypothesis.3
6
Probably the most widely cited research in these years was a
"longitudinal" study-tracking correlations over time-to determine
whether early preferences for violent entertainment correlate with
aggression later in life. The researchers (Eron and Huesmann among
them) found no correlation between violent TV viewing at age eight
34. Stuart Fischoff, Psychology's Quixotic Quest for the Media-Violence Connection, 4 J.
MEDIA PSYCH. (1999), at www.calstatela.edu/faculty/sfischo/violence.html.
35. Jonathan L. Freedman, Effect of Television Violence on Aggressiveness, 96 PSYCH.
BULL. 227 (1984).
36. Jonathan L. Freedman, Viewing Television Violence Does Not Make People More
Aggressive, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 833, 843-46 (1994). The study Freeman critiqued was Lynette
Kohn Friedrich & Aletha Huston Stein, Aggressive and Prosocial Television Programs and the
Natural Behavior of Preschool Children, 38 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOC'Y FOR RES. IN CHILD
DEV. (Serial No. 151) (1973).
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and aggressive behavior at age eighteen for two out of three measures
of aggression. But there was a correlation for boys on a third measure
of aggression: peer reports. They publicized this one statistic and
claimed proof of harm from TV violence.37
They also later claimed a correlation between viewing violent TV
in childhood and committing violent crime at age thirty. (Etzioni cites
this claim twice.) Oddly, however, Eron and Huesmann did not dis-
close the actual numbers of violent criminals on whom they based
their conclusions, and their published report did not mention a link
between early violent viewing and adult crime at all. Nevertheless,
Huesmann testified in 1986 before the U.S. Senate using a dramatic
bar graph based on this study that purportedly showed violent TV
causes violent crime. When, years later, journalist Richard Rhodes
asked for the numbers, Huesmann acknowledged that the correlation
shown in his bar graph was based on just three individuals-much too
small a number to permit meaningful conclusions.
3 8
Huesmann went on to write a pivotal article on media violence in
the next major government report, released in 1982.19 It was an oppor-
tunity, as Rowland observes, to "provide a resurgent call to arms" by
those "disappointed in the cautious tone" of the 1972 government
report.4° But many experts disputed its claim that harmful effects had
been proven. Thomas Cook and other scholars reviewing the 1982
report, for example, wrote that field experiments on TV violence had
produced "little consistent evidence of effects, despite claims to the
contrary. '41 Yale professor William McGuire wrote that despite the
hype, two decades of media-effects research had found little or no
real-world behavioral impact from violent entertainment.42
37. Leonard D. Eron et al., Does Television Violence Cause Aggression?, 27 AM. PSYCHOL
253 (1972).
38. Richard Rhodes, The Media-Violence Myth, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 23, 2000, at 55, 56;
E-mail from L. Rowell Huesmann to Richard Rhodes, (Mar. 13, 2000) (on file with the Free
Expression Policy Project). The follow-up study was reported in L. Rowell Huesmann et al., The
Stability of Aggression Over Time and Generations, 20 DEVELEPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1120
(1984).
39. L. Rowell Huesmann, Television Violence and Aggressive Behavior, in TELEVISION
AND BEHAVIOR: TEN YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EIGHTIES
126 (David Pearl et al. eds., 1982).
40. Willard Rowland, Jr., Television Violence Redux: The Continuing Mythology of Effects,
in ILL EFFECTS: THE MEDIA/VIOLENCE DEBATE 102, 113 (Martin Barker & Julian Petley eds.,
1997).
41. Thomas D. Cook et al., The Implicit Assumptions of Television Research: An Analysis
of the 1982 NIMH Report on Television and Behavior, 47 PUB. OPINION 0. 161, 181-82 (1983).
42. William J. McGuire, The Myth of Massive Media Impact: Savagings and Salvagings, in 1
PUBLIC COMMUNICATION AND BEHAVIOR 173,174 (George Comstock ed., 1986).
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Meanwhile, research was emerging that undermined the causal
hypothesis. In 1986, Steven Messner reported negative correlations
between exposure to violent TV and violent crime in 281 metropoli-
tan areas. Messner stated: "The data consistently indicate that high
levels of exposure to violent television content are accompanied by
relatively low rates of violent crime."
43
Psychologist Joyce Sprafkin, initially a believer in the causal hy-
pothesis, changed her mind after conducting her own experiments,
which found more aggressive behavior associated with nonviolent
shows like "Sesame Street" and "Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood."
Sprafkin later described her reaction: "I decided to look back care-
fully at the field and say, well, what have other people really found?"
For pre-school children, the field studies simply "did not support a
special significance for aggressive television." 44
An ambitious cross-national study coordinated by Huesmann
and Eron found no significant correlations over time between chil-
dren's media violence viewing and aggressive behavior in six coun-
tries. The only strong correlations were for two groups of Israeli city
dwellers. Yet in this case, as Freedman recounts, most of the re-
searchers "tried to put the best face on it that they could" in the book
that resulted. "[T]hey hedged, did other analyses, and tried to make it
sound as if the results supported the initial prediction that television
violence would increase aggression." The Dutch researchers, how-
ever, "came right out and said that there was no evidence of an ef-
fect." Huesmann and Eron refused to publish their chapter unless
they revised their conclusions.
45
In 2002, Freedman published a review of some 200 experiments
or studies-all that he could locate-attempting to test the causal
hypothesis. (There are not "thousands" of empirical studies, as pro-
ponents of the causal hypothesis often claim.) Freedman found that
43. Steven F. Messner, Television Violence and Violent Crime: An Aggregate Analysis, 33
SOC. PROBS. 218, 228 (1986).
44. Transcript of Civil Cause for Hearing Before the Honorable Michael L. Orenstein at
112-13, Eclipse Enters. v. Gulotta (No. CV-92-3416) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1994) (testimony of
Joyce Sprafkin); see also Joyce Spraflcin et al., Effects of Viewing Aggressive Cartoons on the
Behavior of Learning Disabled Children, 28 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 387, 394
(1987); Kenneth D. Gadow & Joyce Sprafkin, Field Experiments of Television Violence With
Children: Evidence for an Environmental Hazard?, 83 PEDIATRICS 399, 404 (1989).
45. Freedman, supra note 36, at 849-51. The Dutch researchers published their report
separately; they wrote: "The hypothesis, formulated on the basis of social learning theory, that
television violence viewing leads to aggressive behaviour could not be supported." Oene Wieg-
man et al., A Longitudinal Study of the Effects of Television Viewing on Aggressive and Proso-
cial Behaviours, 31 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 147, 147 (1992).
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most had negative results, even accepting as positive some experi-
ments that used poor, almost ridiculous, proxies for aggression (such
as popping balloons or hitting Bobo dolls). Of eighty-seven labora-
tory experiments, 37 percent supported the causal hypothesis, 22 per-
cent had mixed results, and 41 percent were non-supportive. After
Freedman factored out experiments using "the most doubtful meas-
ures of aggression," only 28 percent of the results were supportive, 16
percent were mixed, and 55 percent were non-supportive of the
causal hypothesis. For field experiments, the lack of proof was even
more striking: "[o]nly three of the ten studies obtained even slightly
supportive results," and even this weak showing gave "a more favor-
able picture than is justified," for several of the studies with null re-
sults actually consisted of many separate studies. Counting the results
of these separate studies, three field experiments found some support;
twenty did not. 46
Freedman was not alone in his conclusions. In 1999, the British
medical journal The Lancet criticized American professional associa-
tions for falsely claiming proven harmful effects from media violence.
The editors wrote: "It is inaccurate to imply that the published work
strongly indicates a causal link between virtual and actual violence.
47
Similarly, in 2000, the Federal Trade Commission conducted a thor-
ough review of media-violence research. It reported that no firm con-
clusions about adverse effects could be drawn.48
B. The Wrong Methodology
Despite the overall failure to prove harmful effects, some media
violence studies have reported positive findings. A number of factors
probably explain these occasional positive results.
The first relates to the fundamental definitional problem that
I've already noted. Both violence and aggression are broad concepts.
Researchers have used vastly different examples of violent content in
the cartoons, film clips, or games that they study. Their generaliza-
tions about violence in art or entertainment from these differing, spe-
46. JONATHAN L. FREEDMAN, MEDIA VIOLENCE AND ITS EFFECT ON AGGRESSION:
ASSESSING THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 56, 62-63, 106-07 (2002).
47. Editorial, Guns, Lies, and Videotape, 354 LANCET 525, 525 (1999).
48. Federal Trade Commission, Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children: A Review of
Self-Regulation and Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording & Electronic
Game Industries app. A (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/violence/appendicesviorpt.pdf.
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cific examples are not trustworthy, and they fail to account for the
many different contexts in which violence is presented.
Another serious problem is that researchers testing responses to
media violence have not always made their nonviolent excerpts
equivalent to their violent ones in respect to other variables such as
general level of interest or excitement. Freedman gives a striking ex-
ample: an early, much-cited experiment that compared subjects' be-
havior after watching either an exciting film clip of a prizefight or a
soporific clip about canal boats. Since the canal boat film was not as
exciting as the prizefight film, it was likely that the subjects' general
arousal level, not their imitation of violence onscreen, accounted for a
statistical difference in their subsequent lab behavior.49
Measuring aggression is a further problem. Proxies for aggres-
sion in lab experiments range from dubious (administering noise
blasts to an opponent, striking Bobo dolls, or killing characters in a
video game) to ludicrous (popping balloons, interpreting ambiguous
stories in a way that coders consider "more hostile", or recommend-
ing a grant termination). 0 Psychologist Craig Anderson, testing the
effects of violent video games, measured "aggressive cognition"-the
speed with which one recognizes aggressive words on a computer
screen. Based in part on small differences in reaction time, he claimed
to have shown that violent video games have adverse effects. 51
In many of these situations, experimenters are actually measur-
ing aggressive play, which is quite different from real-world aggres-
sion. Indeed, aggressive play (as in sporting events) often provides a
socially approved outlet for impulses that otherwise might take dan-
49. See FREEDMAN, supra note 46, at 79. The study Freedman critiqued was Leonard
Berkowitz et al., Film Violence and Subsequent Aggressive Tendencies, 27 PUB. OPIN. Q. 217,
223 (1963).
50. The grant termination example is from Fischoff, supra note 34; the "more hostile"
interpretation example is from Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Video Games and Aggres-
sive Thoughts, Feelings, and Behavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL 772, 784-85 (2000). See also Ellen Wolock, Is There a Reasonable Approach to Han-
dling Violence in Videogames?, CHILDREN'S SOFTWARE & NEW MEDIA REVUE, July/Aug.
2002, at 24, 25 (occasional findings of short-term effects are questionable, given how "aggressiv-
ity" is measured- "increase in heart rate and blood pressure, negative responses on question-
naires, toy choice, etc."), available at http://www.childrenssoftware.com/pdf/violence.pdf; Craig
E. Emes, Is Mr Pac Man Eating Our Children? A Review of the Effect of Video Games on Chil-
dren, 42 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 409, 413 (1997) ("the reliability and validity of the procedures
used to measure aggression are questionable").
51. See Anderson & Dill, supra note 50, at 784-86. This experiment also used the intensity
and duration of "noise blasts" that the subjects administered as a proxy for aggression. When
the two groups showed no difference in intensity of blasts administered, Anderson and Dill
dropped that measure and focused only on duration. Id.
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gerous forms. Professor Jeffrey Goldstein notes: "In the rare study
that measures both aggressive play and aggressive behavior, violent
video games affect the former and not the latter.
'5 2
Thus, the argument that the statistical link between media vio-
lence and aggression is as strong as the link between cigarette smok-
ing and cancer (or other physiological analogs that are often used),
even if it were true empirically, which it is not, would be meaningless,
because while scientists can measure the presence or absence of dis-
ease, psychologists cannot measure real aggression through the prox-
ies used in lab experiments.
A final problem is the "experimenter demand" factor. Not only
are behaviors permitted and encouraged in experiments that would
be disapproved outside the lab, but subjects generally know what the
researcher is looking for. Numerous scholars have noted this prob-
lem.53
Why have many media-violence researchers ignored these prob-
lems, or acknowledged them and then proceeded as if their claimed
results were still meaningful? Why have they exaggerated or just plain
misreported the results of media-violence research? And why do poli-
ticians, professional associations, and many scholars who should know
better continue to rely on these misrepresentations?
One can posit various theories. On a superficial level, the causal
hypothesis seems to make sense. Indeed, we all can summon up anec-
dotal evidence of children imitating violent entertainment (even if it
is play and not real-world imitation). More generally, it seems obvi-
ous that the overall cultural atmosphere does affect adolescents and
children; indeed, it affects all of us. The problem remains that we
cannot measure what the various effects are. Finally, social-science
researchers are subject to the usual human frailties, including the de-
sire for prestige, career advancement, grant money, and recognition
for announcing results that political leaders and at least a portion of
the public want to hear.
52. Jeffrey Goldstein, Does Playing Violent Video Games Cause Aggressive Behavior?,
http://culturalpolicy.uchicago.edu/conf200l/papers/goldstein.html (Oct. 27, 2001) (citation
omitted).
53. E.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 46, at 49-51; Guy Cumberbatch, Video Violence: Villain
or Victim?, www.videostandards.org.uk/videoviolence.htm (n.d.) (quoting "one shrewd four
year-old who, on arriving at the laboratory... was heard to whisper to her mother 'Look
mummy! There's the doll we have to hit!').
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C. More Sensible Approaches to Media-Effects Research
The causal hypothesis has received great attention, but it repre-
sents only one view of media effects. Other scholars take more nu-
anced and less simplistic approaches to both the media and human
aggression. Theorists of aggression look to social conditions, family
environment, brain chemistry, and variations in human character.14
Humanist media scholars, as Professor David Buckingham explains,
look at "the diverse and active ways in which children and young
people use the media for different social and psychological pur-
poses."55
There is a large literature reflecting this humanist, non-
quantitative approach to media effects, an approach that emphasizes
the cognitive and social processes by which children and adults inter-
pret media representations. Professor Christina Slade describes this
methodology as being "sensitive to the ways people actually use tele-
vision" and thus avoiding "the worst excesses of earlier research"
(such as Bandura's Bobo doll experiments).1
6
For example, contributors to the anthology Why We Watch re-
port that some children "seek out violent programming that features
heroes triumphing over villains in an effort to control their anxie-
ties."57 They observe that historically, as real-world violence in daily
life has decreased, "representations" have "supplanted actual experi-
ence" as a way for youngsters to cope with their desires, fantasies, and
fears.5 8 Similarly, psychologist Jeffrey Arnett, studying a correlation
54. See, e.g., ERICH FROMM, THE ANATOMY OF HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS (1973);
JONATHAN KELLERMAN, SAVAGE SPAWN: REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENT CHILDREN (1999);
KONRAD LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (Marjorie Kerr Wilson trans., 1966); ROLLO MAY,
POWER AND INNOCENCE: A SEARCH FOR THE SOURCES OF VIOLENCE (1972); DEBRA
NIEHOFF, THE BIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE: How UNDERSTANDING THE BRAIN, BEHAVIOR, AND
ENVIRONMENT CAN BREAK THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF AGGRESSION (1999).
55. David Buckingham, Electronic Child Abuse? Rethinking the Media's Effects on Chil-
dren, in ILL EFFECTS: THE MEDIAIVIOLENCE DEBATE, supra note 40, at 34.
56. CHRISTINA SLADE, THE REAL THING: DOING PHILOSOPHY WITH MEDIA 7-10 (2002).
57. Joanne Cantor, Children's Attraction to Violent Television Programming, in WHY WE
WATCH: THE ATrRACTIONS OF VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT 113 (Jeffrey Goldstein ed., 1998).
58. Vicki Goldberg, Death Takes a Holiday, Sort Of, in WHY WE WATCH: THE
ATrRACTIONS OF VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT, supra note 57, at 28; see also Clark McCauley,
When Screen Violence is Not Attractive, in WHY WE WATCH: THE ATrRACTIONS OF VIOLENT
ENTERTAINMENT, supra note 57, at 149 (the "violation of norms... holds a fascination for
people to the extent that they rarely see these violations in everyday experience"); Celia Pearce,
Beyond Shoot Your Friends: A Call to Arms in the Battle Against Violence, in DIGITAL
ILLUSION: ENTERTAINING THE FUTURE WITH HIGH TECHNOLOGY 218 (Clark Dodsworth Jr.
ed., 1998) (as actual violence in society has decreased, especially as a form of public entertain-
ment (beheadings, mutilations, etc.), we have, perhaps, "evolved to the point where more of our
violence is vicarious than actual").
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between adolescents' reckless behavior and preference for violent
music, found sensation-seeking to be the independent factor that ac-
counts for both the preference and the behavior. He reported that
"adolescents who like heavy metal music listen to it especially when
they are angry and that the music has the effect of calming them down
and dissipating their anger."5 9
Professor Henry Jenkins of MIT summed up the understanding
gained from this approach to media effects when he wrote that many
young people "move nomadically across the media landscape, cob-
bling together a personal mythology of symbols and stories, and in-
vesting those appropriated materials with various personal and
subcultural meanings." Because of this wide variety of responses,
Jenkins says, "universalizing claims are fundamentally inadequate in
accounting for media's social and cultural impact." 6
The National Academy of Sciences ("NAS"), in its 1993 study of
the causes of violence, agreed. The NAS pointed out that the causal
hypothesis is simplistic because it fails to consider either how differ-
ent individuals respond to identical stimuli, or how different individu-
als' psychosocial, neurological, and hormonal characteristics interact
to produce behavior.
61
Violent crime rates across the United States have fallen signifi-
cantly in the past decade, even while violence in entertainment has
increased. Youth violence in particular has seen dramatic reduc-
tions.62 In 1996, two criminologists reported that homicide rates in
59. Jeffrey Arnett, The Soundtrack of Recklessness: Musical Preferences and Reckless
Behavior Among Adolescents, 7 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 313, 328 (1992); see also Jeffrey Arnett,
Adolescents and Heavy Metal Music: From the Mouths of Metalheads, 23 YOUTH & SOC. 76, 83
(1991); Lawrence A. Kurdek, Gender Differences in the Psychological Symptomatology and
Coping Strategies of Young Adolescents, 7 J. EARLY ADOLESCENCE 395, 403 tbl.4 (1987) (listen-
ing to music is useful to adolescents in purging anger).
60. Henry Jenkins, Professor Jenkins Goes to Washington, HARPER'S, July 1999, at 23;
Henry Jenkins, Lessons From Littleton: What Congress Doesn't Want to Hear About Youth and
Media, INDEP. SCH. MAG., Winter 2000, available at
www.nais.org/pubs/ismag.cfm?file-id=537&ismagid=14; see also Jeffrey Goldstein, Why We
Watch, in WHY WE WATCH: THE ATTRACTIONS OF VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT, supra note 57,
at 216-20 (the appeals of violent entertainment include mood management, sensation-seeking
and excitement, emotional expression, and the state of "flow" one experiences when immersed
in an activity).
61. PANEL ON THE UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROL OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 101-02 (Albert J. Reiss,
Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993).
62. See MIKE A. MALES, FRAMING YOUTH: TEN MYTHS ABOUT THE NEXT GENERATION
5-6,28-70 (1999); JIB FOWLES, THE CASE FOR TELEVISION VIOLENCE 52-53 (1999); FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2000: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
(rates of violent crime for youths aged 10-17 at their lowest level since 1987; between 1990-
2000, juvenile violence arrest rates fell 27 percent (from 433.5 per 100,000 in 1990 to 316.5 in
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many countries, including the U.S., had decreased over the previous
two decades despite significant increases in media violence.63
This does not mean that youth violence is not a serious prob-
lem-or for that matter, that media messages do not have powerful
effects. In some instances, those effects include imitation. But often,
the effects are cathartic, providing vicarious adventure or harmless
outlets for aggression, as researchers like Buckingham, Arnett, Jen-
kins, and others have found. The point is that broad generalizations
about the effects of such large categories of expression as "media
violence" are bound to be crude and simplistic, and they cannot give
us a true picture of the complexity and variety of media effects.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF MINORS AND THE
INTERESTS OF SOCIETY
Etzioni recognizes that as minors mature, it is important for
older ones to have access to a wide variety of art and ideas-even
controversial ones. But then, contradicting his recognition of minors'
gradual maturing, he posits a familiar but false dichotomy between
First Amendment rights and "protection of children." This dichotomy
relies, of course, on an assumption about "harm to minors" that, as
we have seen, is based not on science, but on generalized notions of
offensiveness and possible corruption. Whether censorship is needed
to protect minors of any age remains an open question, though Etzi-
oni is obviously right that intellectual freedom and First Amendment
rights are meaningless concepts for very young children.
The Supreme Court has not given us much help here. On the one
hand, the Court has established that, even elementary school children
have free-expression rights: the right not to salute the flag, for exam-
ple, or to wear black armbands in symbolic and non-disruptive ex-
pression of opposition to war.61 As Justice Robert Jackson wrote for
the Court in the flag-salute case, the fact that schools are "educating
the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Con-
stitutional freedoms ... if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
2000), including a record 68 percent drop in homicides (from 12.1 per 100,000 in 1990 to 3.9 in
2000)); Violent Crime Fell 9% in '01, Victim Survey Shows, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at
A18 ("The number of people who were victims of all violent crimes except homicide fell by 9
percent in 2001, sending the crime rate to its lowest level since it was first tracked in 1973.").
63. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 133-34, 239-43 (1997).
64. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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source and teach youth to discount important principles of our gov-
ernment as mere platitudes. '65 Quoting this language, Justice Abe
Fortas, in the black armband case, went on to note that children "may
not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate.
66
On the other hand, when it comes to sexual content, the Court
has given not only school administrators but the government-at-large
broad scope in restricting minors' access to ideas-and without re-
quiring a showing of harm. Contrary to Etzioni's assertion, though,
the leading case in this area, Ginsberg v. New York, did not find a
"compelling public interest ' 67 in shielding minors from sexual mate-
rial. Instead, Justice William Brennan, writing for the Court in Gins-
berg, posited that minors (making no distinction between six- and
sixteen-year-olds) have lesser First Amendment rights than adults;
hence, the "girlie" magazines at issue in the case, although constitu-
tionally protected for adults-because not obscene-were unpro-
tected for youth. With this jurisprudential sleight-of-hand, Brennan
concluded the government need not show a compelling need to re-
strict minors' access to the material (since it was not First Amend-
ment-protected for them). Instead, any "rational basis" would suffice,
and in Ginsberg, the rational-basis standard was satisfied by the legis-
lature's asserted interest in the "ethical and moral development of
youth. 68
Admittedly, the Supreme Court itself seems to have forgotten
that Ginsberg's justification for censoring youth turned only on ra-
tional-basis scrutiny, and it has since stated that government has a
compelling interest in shielding minors from "indecent messages that
are not obscene by adult standards. ' 69 The Court has not required any
showing of harm, however; the compelling interest has simply been
assumed.
65. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
66. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
67. Etzioni, supra note 2, at 6.
68. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-41 (1968). For more on Ginsberg's rational-
basis analysis and in particular its reliance on psychiatric theory to justify taboos on adolescents'
access to seductive sexual material just at the age when it most interests them, see NOT IN
FRONT OF THE CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 71-76.
69. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869, 863 n.30 (1997) ("[g]overnment generally has a
compelling interest in protecting minors from 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' speech."); see
also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("[T]here is a compel-
ling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors ... [that] extends
to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.").
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Nor has the Court been clear in delineating what "indecent"
messages minors should not hear. In Reno v. ACLU, the Court's 1997
decision striking down the Communications Decency Act, it cited
examples of potentially indecent expression that would not necessar-
ily be harmful to minors-including the famous George Carlin
"Seven Dirty Words" monolog that was at issue in the 1978 case of
FCC v. Pacifica.0 In Pacifica, the Court approved the broad, vague
indecency standard for broadcasting, assumed that the Carlin mono-
log met the standard, and gave a wide berth to federal censorship of
the airwaves in the presumed interest of protecting youth.71 If the
decision in Reno was not an outright rejection of Pacifica (both deci-
sions were written by Justice Stevens), it certainly reflected a calmer
approach to the notion of presumed harm to minors from sexual mes-
sages or vulgar words. And it resoundingly rejected the government's
argument for extending the Pacifica indecency standard to the Inter-
net.
Thus, the First Amendment rights of minors vary depending on
subject matter, with sex the most disapproved category. Etzioni
would expand that category to include violence, but as previously
noted, without even attempting to define what kind of violent content
he thinks is sufficiently offensive, corrupting, or immoral to be re-
stricted. A number of courts have had to address this question as state
or local governments have expanded their obscenity-based "harmful
to minors" prohibitions to cover violence as well.
In one such case, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals gave an eloquent response. Violent themes have
always been part of children's literature, Posner observed; to shield
youngsters from the subject until they are adults "would not only be
quixotic, but deforming; it would leave them unequipped to cope with
the world as we know it." Children and adolescents, Posner said, are
"unlikely to become well-functioning, independent-minded adults
and responsible citizens if they are raised in an intellectual bubble.
72
70. Reno, 521 U.S. at 866-67, 878.
71. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 742, 744, 747 (1978). The indecency standard
consists of just one of the three parts of the Miller v. California obscenity test; that is, whether
the language describes sexual or excretory activities or organs in a manner that is "patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium." Id. at
732; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
72. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577-79 (7th Cir. 2001) (strik-
ing down ordinance restricting minors' access to violent video games in arcades). St. Louis
passed a similar ordinance, banning sale or distribution to minors of video games with "graphic
violence"; in 2002, a federal district court upheld it, but in June 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals
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As a matter of public policy, what free-expression analysis makes
sense for minors? Rules of constitutional law flow from public policy
concerns: what is a "compelling state interest"; what is the concept of
a "public forum"? And what are the underlying values of the First
Amendment? As Justice Stewart said, concurring in Ginsberg, chil-
dren are "not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. '73 On
the other hand, as Justice Brennan wrote in the Supreme Court's 1982
school library censorship case, "students must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and under-
standing. '"74
How to resolve this paradox? First, Etzioni and I agree that be-
low the age of seven or eight, it makes little sense to talk of First
Amendment rights for minors. Of course, this does not mean that the
government can put a young child in jail for wearing a political but-
ton, or that any sort of censorship scheme would be constitutional as
long as it doesn't impact anyone older than seven. But for purposes of
preserving and enhancing intellectual freedom, the usual "age of rea-
son" (about age seven) seems a good place to start.
At the other end of the spectrum, teenagers above age fifteen or
so are as mentally capable as adults (in many cases, more so), and
they are at the height of their sexual powers and sexual interest. It is
important for them to get good, explicit sexual information and to
understand what pornography is and in what ways it distorts human
sexuality. It is also important that they have free access to political
and artistic ideas because they are on the verge of becoming full-
fledged citizens in a democratic society, and they cannot be expected
to fulfill that role if they are shielded from disturbing ideas and im-
ages until they are eighteen. Society's moral or pedagogical interest in
imposing taboos is not sufficient justification for affording them lesser
First Amendment rights than adults.
What about the kids in the middle (ages eight to fifteen, ap-
proximately)? I agree with Etzioni that their free-expression rights
for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d
954 (8th Cir. 2003). Other cases striking down restrictions on minors' access to violent images or
ideas include Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Web-
ster, 968 F.2d 684, 691 (8th Cir. 1992); Eclipse Enters. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1997);
and Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 532-33 (Tenn. 1993).
73. Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
74. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
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are lesser in magnitude than those of older minors and adults. I would
therefore suggest a First Amendment balancing test less stringent
than "compelling state interest/strict scrutiny" but nonetheless de-
manding enough so that government censorship aimed at the eight to
fifteen age group is based on something more substantial than gener-
alized notions of what is "appropriate" for children. Minors, like
adults, are distinct individuals with different interests and levels of
understanding. Age-staggered blocking and rating schemes are blunt
instruments for determining appropriateness for kids this age, and
they inevitably censor material that would be educational for some of
them.
Most importantly, it's only a matter of guesswork whether even
clearly age-inappropriate materials are actually harmful. This rein-
forces the point that the understandable concerns of many parents
and policy wonks over mass media content, and their legitimate inter-
ests in the moral education and socialization of youth, are better ac-
complished by education than by censorship.
V. NON-CENSORIAL SOLUTIONS
Neither mistaken notions about proven harm from media sex or
violence, nor the doctrinal pigeonholes that have come to dominate
First Amendment analysis, are really useful in addressing the public
policy issue of mass media content and minors. The courts can set
some First Amendment ground rules, but it is up to the political
branches and the nonprofit sector to set constructive policy. Likewise,
political grandstanding and attacks on particularly abhorrent media
creations may garner headlines and indignation, but they do nothing
to resolve the underlying problem.
How should we deal, then, with troubling media messages and
ideas? As one pundit suggested, there are three answers: education,
education, and more education. This approach should include:
- Media literacy education that teaches kids how to analyze me-
dia messages, including (especially) commercials, and how to test
them against social, family, and community values. Media literacy
education does not flatly condemn all sexual or violent content or try
to persuade students that their favorite songs and TV shows are terri-
ble, but it gets them to think about the issues, and about how they
watch, listen, and respond. Media literacy education also includes
youth arts and journalism projects that give minors a hands-on under-
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standing of media production, and real-world experience in thinking
and communicating about social issues.75
- Independent, diverse, nonprofit alternative media that give
youngsters attractive alternatives to corporate mass-media creations.
This requires not only censorship-free funding of public broadcasting
and the arts, but regulatory action-controlling media consolidation
(and breaking up large conglomerates) to make room for noncom-
mercial alternatives; providing broadcast frequencies for nonprofit
ventures; and enforcing and expanding cable TV public-access re-
quirements.
- Serious, comprehensive sexuality education-not the ideologi-
cally driven, medically irresponsible "abstinence" education that cur-
rently dominates federal sex-ed policy and that, scandalously,
prohibits teaching students about the importance of contraception
and safer sex. 76
- More nuanced, truly useful information about movies, music,
and other aspects of popular culture, rather than simplistic, decontex-
tualized ratings and labeling schemes.
CONCLUSION
Etzioni speaks to commonly and deeply held concerns about the
mass media's effect on youth, but his article has serious flaws. He
assumes harm, and he inaccurately discusses social-science research.
He does not address the definitional quagmire of censorship, and he
minimizes the evil of Internet filters.
Nevertheless, Etzioni raises important questions. He rightly
notes the importance of differentiating among minors of different
ages when seeking answers to concerns about media content. And he
struggles for a balance between individual rights and communitarian
interests. In this critique, I have suggested that the Internet filtering,
TV rating, and other measures Etzioni promotes undermine free-
75. See MARJORIE HEINS & CHRISTINA CHO, FREE EXPRESSION POLICY PROJECT,
MEDIA LITERACY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO CENSORSHIP,
www.fepproject.org/policyreports/medialiteracy2d.html (2003).
76. See National Coalition Against Censorship, Abstinence-Only Education: A Joint State-
ment, www.ncac.org/issues/abonlypresskit.html#jointstmt (June 12, 2001); NOT IN FRONT OF
THE CHILDREN, supra note 1, at 137-56; see generally, JANICE M. IRVINE, TALK ABOUT SEX:
THE BATTLES OVER SEX EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2002). The federal abstinence-
only education law was a late addition to the 1996 welfare reform statute, Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 710 (2000)).
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expression values, do nothing to educate youth, and are probably
counterproductive. The next step is for all those interested in a pro-
gressive public policy that truly serves minors to get together and
work on non-censorial solutions.
7
77. Etzioni's Response, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 299 (2004), badly misrepresents the sub-
stance of this Article. Nowhere do I agree with his asserted "need to defend children from
violent material." Instead, I show that "harm" is unproven, in part because we cannot even
define what we think might be harmful. Nor do I ignore his assertion that Internet filters are
"improving"; on the contrary, I show that because of their mechanistic nature, they cannot be
meaningfully improved. Worst, Etzioni twists my distinction between evidence of physical harm
(for example, from tobacco), and failed attempts to prove psychological harm from expression.
Nowhere do I say that science cannot prove harm from tobacco or other toxins; what I do say is
that social science has not and probably cannot prove harm from something as broad and vague
as "media violence." These misrepresentations do not advance the cause of reasoned debate.
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